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31.1. What is international taxation?
International aspects of the tax laws of particular countries
•Tax sovereignty
•No international law of taxation
•No international organization that deals with international 
tax issues and disputes (unlike WTO trade regime)
Advisory bodies on tax policies
•Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
•UN Committee of Fiscal Affairs
41.2.  Importance of international 
taxation
•Globalization: Growth on trade, investment, 
communications, computer technology. 
•Globalization influence on a country’s domestic tax law: 
rules are adopted to remove obstacles for investment and 
reinforcing the capital market
•BUT while in other areas (trade) restrictions are removed, it 
is not possible to remove taxation. Taxation needs to be 
retained in some for the financing of the governments. 
•International tax rules focus on income tax (major source of 
revenue) and of greatest concern to foreign investors and 
expatriate personnel.  
51.3. International tax: Revenue vs 
Investment?
International tax rules to deal with cross-border (2 
countries) situations. To bear in mind: Balance between the 
country’s need to protect their base revenue and the 
country’s need to attract foreign investment. 
International tax includes issues arising under a country’s 
tax law that include some foreign element: 
•cross-border trade in goods and services, 
•cross-border manufacturing by a MNE, 
•cross-border investment by individuals or investment funds,
•taxation of individuals who work or do business outside the 
country where they actually reside. 
61.4. International Tax Principles: 
Territoriality
In the past, territoriality principle: 
Country has the right to tax all incomes and activities within 
its territory. 
Tax policies by any one country could be pursued without 
much concern or though about how they would affect other 
countries
71.4. International Tax Principles: 
Source vs. Residence 
•Source principle: Link between the country and the economic 
activity
•Residence principle: Link between the country and the person
•Resident: Taxation of persons who belong to a country and work, 
enter into transactions or have property or income abroad. This 
person is resident (belong to a country) but carry activities in other 
country (cross-border) therefore in the other country the person 
can be regarded as non-resident. 
•Non-resident: Taxation of persons from outside a country who 
work, enter into transactions or have property or income abroad. 
Non-residents will be only taxed on the income sourced in that 
country.
81.5. Tax treaties
•Tax treaties international agreements entered by countries 
and subject to the general international law on treaties 
(Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Most of the 
treaties involve two countries (thus bilateral)
•Tax treaties (more than 2000) impose significant limitations 
on the taxation powers of the treaty partners. 
•Tax treaties do not impose tax but it provides tax relief. 
•Objectives to prevent double taxation, tax evasion and 
aggressive tax planning (treaty shopping).
91.5. Tax treaties vs. Unilateral rules
Tax treaties vs. unilateral rules
Unilateral: State give up their taxation rights created in national law one-
sided. The Netherlands where no double tax treaty, or the tax treaty does 
not include a specific provisions (tax, taxpayer, income, property, estate, 
gift) the unilateral rules laid down in the Decree on the Avoidance of 
Double Taxation are applicable. 
Tax treaties: OECD and UN Model
•OECD Model (latest version 2017)
•UN Model (latest version 2017) for developing countries (mandatory 
arbitration, exchange of information, rules for dividends, interest and 
royalties).
•Both OECD and UN: Commentary- dynamic, static interpretation.
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1.5. Tax treaties: Purpose
•Tax treaty: To facilitate cross-border trade and investment 
by eliminating the tax impediments to these cross-border 
flows
Three primary objectives: 
•To reduce the risk of double taxation to taxpayers engaged in 
cross-border transactions and 
•To mitigate the risks of under-taxation and tax evasion by 
promoting cooperation among countries around the world.
•To prevent double non-taxation and tax treaty shopping) 
Ancillary objectives; 
•Prevention of discrimination, exchange of information and 
mutual cooperation in the resolution of disputes. 
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1.6. Challenges international 
taxation
•Main problem: Double taxation or double non taxation (no 
tax at all)
•Double taxation: More than one country seek to tax without 
reference to the other tax levied in the other country 
(discourages investment- barrier to international 
transactions)
•Double non-taxation: No country may tax: assumption that 
another country is taxing or as a result of tax planning, tax 
evasion or tax avoidance. (revenue loss). 
•How to tax?  If there is no linkage to the country or it is 
difficult to know what kind of activities the other person is 
carrying abroad. 
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1.6. Challenges international 
taxation
Challenges: To find the income, to tax it, to enforce the tax 
and to make companies to comply with tax. 
•Complexity of the transactions resulting in double non-
taxation, or low taxation. 
•Lack of information exchange between tax administrations
•Use of tax havens: Barbados, Cayman
Challenges different for developing and developed countries. 
Developing countries lack of resources, and advance 
knowledge of international taxation to tackle complex 
transactions. 
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2. Current instruments/proposals
1. League of Nations, OECD and UN Models. Failure to have a multilateral 
instrument. (developed vs. developing countries). Some OECD projects e.g. 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 1998 Report on Harmful Tax Competition. 
2. Financial crisis: Need for revenue, and to tackle tax evasion and bank 
secrecy. Exchange of Information: On request and then automatic 
(financial account information). Global Transparency Forum 
3. BEPS tackle base erosion and profit shifting by multinationals (see next 
slide) – EU also following these developments. 
4. BEPS Taxation of Highly digitalized business
1. Pillar 1 –3 proposals and 9th October proposal Unified Approach OECD 
Secretariat – Allocation of taxing rights: Nexus (where) and allocation (how)
2. Pillar 2- introduction of a minimum income tax – consequences for tax 
incentives). 
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TAX GOVERNANCE – OECD and 
G20: BEPS 
4 Minimum 
standards
10 Best 
practices
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Multilateral 
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134
JURISDICTIONS 
89 
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INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK SIGNATORIES
BASE EROSION PROFIT SHIFTING 
(BEPS) Decision making: BEPS 44 
GROUP
G20 OECD
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Legitimacy deficits
1. BEPS Inclusive Framework: Peer review input limited from peers due to 
technical capacity among others. IF only for implementation of BEPS 4 
Minimum Standards. MLI different mismatches – bilateral negotiations. 
2. Different needs of developing countries, speed of the reforms and the 
need to balance raising revenue vs attracting investment 
• IMF 2019 Corporate Taxation in the Global Economy
• IMF 2019 The Rise of Phantom Investments 
3. Alignment with Sustainable Development Goals and the 2030 SDG 
Agenda
• Ensure responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative 
decision making at all levels (SDG 16.7)
• Develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions at all 
levels (SDG 16.6)
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Anti-Tax Avoidance
Directive
Standard of Good Tax
Governance
State Aid Investigations
TAX GOVERNANCE: EU AND 
THIRD COUNTRIES
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ACTORS 
Tax Rules 
Tax 
Advisors, 
judges, 
scholars 
Governments
Businesses
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International Tax Rules/Standards
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3. Multilateral instrument
Multilateral instrument to modify bilateral tax treaties. Coexistence of 
bilateral and multilateral instrument. 
Convention in force (July 2018), but only in force for the country after 
deposit instrument of ratification (more than 30 jurisdictions)
Literature 
W. Alschner: The OECD Multilateral Tax Instrument: A model for 
Reforming the International Investment Regime; 
N. Bravo. The Multilateral Tax Instrument and its Relationship with Tax 
Treaties). 
Text MLI https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-
implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-BEPS.pdf
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3. Multilateral instrument
a) Mechanics: Opt-in, opt out convention. Covered tax agreements
- MLI Clauses: Replace DTT language (art 7), modify parallel clauses (art. 5) and 
other complement them (-in the absence of  art. 16(4)(b)(i). 
- Two Minimum Standards: BEPS Action 6 (PPT) and 14 (MAP). By default if not 
choice then, the minimum standard will apply. 
- Problem: Mismatches: Both countries need to choose the provision and the 
covered tax agreement (e.g. PPT and LOB simplified). 
- Countries ratifying even if very few tax treaties. How this influence negotiation 
in the future of tax treaties. 
- Some countries wait and see, before deposit of instrument ratification
- No text consolidation by countries; OECD online toolkit
- Future toolkit OECD Tax treaty Negotiation- No clear how this will dealt with 
MLI, and relationship OECD vs. UN Model Commentary
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21
22
3. Multilateral instrument
b) Content
One substantive and procedure minimum standard (BEPS Action 6 and 14)
Substance: Closes loopholes: Hybrid mistmaches –subject to tax rules; to prevent 
DTT used for treaty shopping (e.g. preamble and PPT); broadens and clarifies the 
definition of p.e.
Procedural: mutual agreement procedures, complementary arbitration procedure 
Challenges
• Provisions to tackle tax avoidance (already in tax treaties e.g. p.e. but needed 
some refinement artificial avoidance p.e. status – commissionaire arrangements, 
splitting of contracts). Still some countries in ratification decided not to adopt 
the provision until a clear dispute resolution mechanism is available (e.g. the 
Netherlands – commissionaire arrangements). 
• Arbitration- time limit –mutual agreement solve procedure within a period of 2 
years. If not arbitration. Baseball arbitration panel of 3 arbitrators selects the 
solution proposed by one of the contracting parties. No reasons, proceedings are 
confidential, final award no precedential effect and the parties remain bound by 
the decision unless they can agree on an alternative solution. see Alschner p. 45)
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3. Multilateral instrument
c) Design 
Varying preferences with the setting of minimum standards. PPT and LOB 
simplified or detailed. Except PPT if a similar provision (conduit tax 
arrangements)
Flexibility also creates mismatches and in some cases result in bilateral 
negotiations
• Position of Malta: BEPS Inclusive Framework vs. MLI excluded CTAs 
(Bulgaria and the United States)
• Match: Also excluded by Bulgaria in the MLI; thus bilateral negotiation 
(Preamble/PPT)
• The United States: no signatory MLI (Preamble/Detailed LOB and domestic 
anti-conduit rules (conduit financing arrangement rules: IRC Title 26 See 
IRC § 1.881-3)
• Position of Malta: CTA with Curaçao. No yet in force. 
• Match: Also included by Curaçao
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